(The following copyrighted article is taken from the Calvin Theological Journal, April, 2000-a publication of Calvin Theological Seminary, 3233 Burton Street, S.E., Grand Rapids, Michigan 49546. It is reproduced with permission and can not be copied without permission of the staff of the Calvin Theological Journal. We express our appreciation for their willingness to have us copy the article and publish it here. May it help to clarify and to resolve some of the problems which arose back in 1924.)
Introduction
The year 1999 marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of the "three points of Kalamazoo," promulgated by the synod of the Christian Reformed Church, convened in Kalamazoo in the summer of 1994. The synod affirmed common grace, and condemned the teachings of two Christian Reformed ministers, Herman Hoeksema and Henry Danhof, who rejected the newly popular concept of common grace. The two ministers also denied that God demonstrates any grace or favor toward the reprobate, or that salvation is in any sense offered to the reprobate in the universal call of the gospel.1 The synod's decision and the surrounding debate over common grace resulted in the most significant ecclesiastical schism that the Christian Reformed Church has yet endured in its history.2
The synod's three points contended that there is a certain grace or favor God shows to his creatures in general, both elect and reprobate; that the Holy Spirit restrains sin in individuals and in society; and that unregenerate persons, while unable to do any saving good, can indeed perform acts of civic good.3 Thus far, these three statements are easily defensible from the standpoint of the history of Reformed theology, exegesis, and confessions. But the latter part of the first point introduces a concept of the general or universal offer of the gospel (algemeene aanbieding des Evangelies), and it is here that the matter becomes much less clear. The first point reads:
Concerning the first point, regarding the favorable disposition of God with respect to mankind in general, and not only to the elect, synod declares that according to the Scripture and the confessions it is certain that, besides the saving grace of God, shown only to the elect unto eternal life, there is a certain kind of favor or grace of God that he shows to his creatures in general. This is evidenced by the aforementioned Scripture texts and from the Canons of Dort II, 5 and III/IV, 8 and 9, where the confession deals with the general offer of the Gospel; while it is evident from the aforementioned declarations of Reformed writers from the most flourishing period of Reformed theology that our Reformed fathers of old have advocated this opinion.4
The latter half of this point not only affirms a general offer of the gospel, but also adduces this universal offer as evidence for God's common grace to all humanity. The report of the synodical advisory committee on common grace makes this matter more specific. The report argues that God is graciously inclined toward the godless and unrighteous, which naturally includes the reprobate.5 Putting aside the questionable nature of this conclusion itself for the moment,6 the proof that the synod produces for the first point includes the assertion that there are biblical texts that indicate that "God comes to all with a well-meant offer of salvation."7 The synodical committee cites Ezekiel 18:23 and 33:11, which indicate that God does not take pleasure in the death of the wicked, and that he would prefer that Israel would repent of its sins and live. The report continues by claiming that the Canons of Dort (II, 5; III/IV, 8-9) deal with the "general offer of the gospel."8 These evidences are followed by the "declarations of Reformed writers from the most flourishing period of Reformed theology," namely, two passages from Calvin's Institutes and one from Peter van Mastricht's Theoretico-Practica Theologia. These passages lend weight to the concept of a general grace of God shown to all, but they do not demonstrate the existence of the doctrine of the well-meant offer in the early history of Reformed theology. 9
The proof adduced for the first of the Kalamazoo points is problematic. In the first place, Reformed theology has generally been reticent to connect any common or universal grace with the process of salvation, particularly since the Remonstrant party, the Arminians, conceived of common grace as a factor that made all individuals capable of responding to the gospel call.10 The first point, however, considers the universality of the call of the gospel to be evidence for the existence of common grace.
More significant, however, is the introduction of the concept of the universal, well-meant offer of salvation. A historical examination of the issue will demonstrate that at this point the synod introduced a quite debatable doctrine into the church, and in doing so misinterpreted the confessions and prominent Reformed theologians. The result was that the ministers Hoeksema and Danhof were condemned, in part, for defending the proper interpretation of the Reformed confessions. Even if one considers their sweeping rejection of common grace to be dubious and extreme, their repudiation of the well-meant offer is much more defensible from a historical and confessional perspective. A further result was that the Christian Reformed Church was left with a doctrine that is of doubtful logical coherence, given the soteriological framework confessed in the Canons of Dort, and that does not find support among leading theological figures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The cause of this unfortunate state of affairs, moreover, appears to be a lamentable lack of careful historical and theological study of the issue by the 1924 synod and its defenders, as well as extreme and uncharitable recriminations on both sides.
Proponents of the Well-Meant Offer
The Three Points In All Parts Reformed--so claimed Louis Berkhof's pamphlet defending the 1924 synodical decision.11 Berkhof was professor of dogmatics at the Christian Reformed seminary, advisor to the synodical committee on common grace, and a highly skilled synthesizer of the Reformed faith.12 Thus it is surprising to discover that his defense of the well-meant offer of the gospel is not only marked by imprecision and misunderstanding in his use of the important theological terms, but it is also lacking in its historical-confessional basis.
It is an unfortunate fact that Berkhof demonstrates very little familiarity with the actual views of Hoeksema and Danhof, and he frequently mischaracterizes their position. He accuses the ministers of preaching only to the elect, and ridicules them for attempting something that only Christ himself could do (since only he knows who the elect are), and that he in fact did not do.13 Berkhof, moreover, bases these accusations on hearsay, rather than on the published writings of the two ministers. At one point Berkhof writes: "According to reports, one of their number, in a recent speech, presented the following depiction of the matter: If a teacher addresses a crowd of a thousand people, God only speaks to a certain number of them, and calls them by name, and this divine speaking must indeed be the offer of the gospel that comes only to the elect."14
There are numerous historical and logical errors in both the synodical report and Berkhof's defense of the well-meant offer. The most glaring logical jump is that which the synod and Berkhof make from the concept of call to that of offer. In the synodical material and in Berkhof's defense of the three points, these two terms are used synonymously and interchangeably. Berkhof states that "this calling of the gospel, or this offer of salvation, is, according to the synod, universal."15 The position of Hoeksema and Danhof, however, was precisely that the nature of the call was not that of an offer, particularly in the modern sense of the term. To use call and offer interchangeably, therefore, begs the question.
The synod's first point cites as evidence certain passages from the Canons of Dort "which deal with the universal offer of the gospel." But in fact, these passages speak of no such thing. Canon II.5 speaks of the mandate to proclaim the gospel to all, including its promises and obligations, to all persons without discrimination. But this refers to the command to preach the gospel to all nations, and really has no bearing on whether this activity, known as the external call, constitutes an offer on God's part to all who hear it. Berkhof, moreover, is very imprecise in his description of the offer. Sometimes he asserts that it is the preacher who is offering salvation through his preaching: elsewhere he claims that God himself is the one who offers salvation to all.16 The matter is further confused by the interchangeability of the phrases "offer of salvation" and "offer of the gospel" in the 1924 synodical report and the writings of its defenders.
The second passage from Dort is III/IV.8, where the Canons declare that those who are called through the gospel are called seriously (serio vocantur). "For seriously and most genuinely God makes known in his Word what is pleasing to him: that those who are called should come to him. Seriously he also promises rest for their souls and eternal life to all who come to him and believe."17 The synod, and Berkhof, read the phrase serio vocanturas an obvious indication that God genuinely offers salvation to all who hear the gospel, including the reprobate--those whom he has decreed to leave in their state of rebellion and to withhold from them "saving faith and the grace of conversion."18 Again, the synod and Berkhof assume that call and offer are synonymous.
In addition, Berkhof notes that the "Remonstrants contended that from the Reformed perspective there could be no well-meant call, because a person's salvation was made completely dependent upon the sovereign operation of God's grace."19 He rightly observes that Canons III/IV.8 are a direct response to one of the Remonstrant objections to the Reformed doctrine of predestination. This was the thesis of the Remonstrant party:
Whomever God calls to salvation, he calls seriously ( serio vocat), that is, with a sincere and completely unhypocritical intention and will to save; nor do we assent to the opinion of those who hold that God calls certain ones externally whom he does not will to call internally, that is, as truly converted, even before the grace of calling has been rejected.20
What Berkhof assumes, but does not demonstrate, is that Dort has the same understanding of what it takes for a call to be serious as the Remonstrants did. It is quite clear, however, that Dort does not share that view. Dort picks up the Remonstrant language of a serious call but does not accept their requirements for such a call, namely, that God must sincerely intend and will to save anyone who receives that call. If the delegates of the Synod of Dort had intended to do so, they certainly would not have stopped with the serious call but would have included the intention and will to save. In fact, Dort rejects the idea that God wills or intends to save all, as should be clear from Canons I.6 and 15. What the Canons actually do in this article is explain how the call can really be serious when, in fact, God does not intend or will the salvation of the reprobate!
Canons III/IV.8 consists of three parts. First, this article affirms that those who are called by the preaching of the gospel are in fact called seriously. This affirmation is followed by a twofold explanation of how this can be the case. This twofold explanation corresponds to a distinction in our understanding of the will of God, a distinction that, as we shall see, is quite common in the Reformed tradition. This is the distinction between God's decretive will or will of the decree (voluntas decreti) and his preceptive will or will of the precept (voluntas praecepti). This distinction is also referred to, with slight variations in emphasis, as that between the will of good pleasure and the will of complacency (eudokia and euarestia), the will of good pleasure and the will of the sign (voluntas beneplaciti and signi), and the secret and revealed will of God (voluntas arcana and revelata).21
The decretive will and its variants refer to God's eternal counsel: what he has decreed will actually occur, either by causing it himself or allowing his creatures to do so. The preceptive will and its variants refer to the rules and duties that God prescribes and reveals to humanity. The will of the decree always comes to pass, while the preceptive will is frequently disobeyed. Thus God commanded Pharaoh to release his people; this was his duty, and reflects the divine voluntas praecepti. But God's decretive will was to allow Pharaoh to follow his own evil inclinations and resist God's command. In this sense, God both wills and does not will that Pharaoh should let his people go. In the Reformed tradition, however, it is the decretive will that is the "ultimate, effective will of God."22
The general call of the gospel is serious because it corresponds to this twofold distinction. First of all, God seriously makes known his revealed will for all creatures, his voluntas praecepti: "seriously and most genuinely God makes known in his Word what is pleasing to him: that those who are called should come to him." The call is serious in that it truly reveals what the duty of sinful humanity is, namely, repentance and faith in God. This first part of the explanation of the serio vocantur does not imply any will or intention to save on God's part; it only reveals the obligation of sinners. Secondly, the Canons go into the voluntas decreti: "Seriously he also promises rest for their souls and eternal life to all who come to him and believe." The call is a promise of salvation for all who do repent and believe, namely, the elect.
Neither the 1924 synod nor Berkhof's pamphlet mention this crucial distinction. Later, in his Systematic Theology, Berkhof does bring this distinction into his discussion of the well-meant offer. Again, he uncritically equates the serious call of Canons III/IV.8 with the well-meant offer affirmed by the 1924 synod.23 He affirms that God "earnestly desires" that the sinner will accept the offer. Berkhof lists two objections to the "bonafideoffer of salvation.' The first has to do with the veracity of God:
It is said that, according to this doctrine, He offers forgiveness of sins and eternal life to those for whom He has not intended these gifts. It need not be denied that there is a real difficulty at this point, but this is the difficulty with which we are always confronted, when we seek to harmonize the decre-tive and preceptive will of God, a difficulty which even the objectors cannot solve and often simply ignore.24
The point of the precept-decree distinction, however, is to clarify how God can command one thing and will the actual occurrence of the opposite! The "difficulty" only arises when one confuses the two, as is the case with the doctrine of the well-meant offer. The objectors have no difficulty to solve; nor are they ignorant of this basic distinction that is operative in the Canons and in major theologians of the Reformation and post-Reformation periods.
Continuing his answer to this objection, Berkhof reminds his readers that the promise of the gospel is conditional, and that "the righteousness of Christ, though not intended for all, is yet sufficient for all."25 Does Berkhof really want to base the well-meant offer on the sufficiency of Christ's atonement? The sufficiency of the atonement only refers to the value or merit of Christ's death, and thus it is theoretical in nature. Had God decreed to save all sinners, the death of Christ would have been more than sufficient to atone for their sins. Berkhof's argument, apparently, is that because Christ's death could have covered the sins of all, therefore salvation can actually be offered to all, including the reprobate. The coherence of this argument is quite questionable: How can that which is not actually acquired or intended for the reprobate be offered to them with the desire that they accept it? In other words, how can Christ be offered to the reprobate, when in fact he has not been offered for them?
This argument based on the sufficiency of Christ's death, moreover, dates back to the sixteenth century, but it was not the Reformed who employed it. John Calvin rightly calls it "a great absurdity" that "has no weight for me." The question, he says, "is not what the power or virtue of Christ is, nor what efficacy it has in itself, but who those are to whom he gives himself to be enjoyed.' The answer to this question is not all humanity in general, but only those whom God designs to be a partaker in Christ.26 Calvin accepts the distinction between the sufficiency and efficacy of Christ's death,27 but he does not believe that this distinction can be employed to teach that God desires or intends salvation, or makes salvation available, for all persons indiscriminately.
The 1924 synod also adduces the next article from the Canons (III/IV.9) to support the concept of a well-meant offer of salvation, although neither the synodical report nor Berkhofs defense of the three points offers an interpretation of this article that would bolster their cause. This is somewhat ironic, since this is the only place where the term offer arises in the English text of the canons: "The fact that many who are called through the ministry of the gospel do not come and are not brought to conversion must not be blamed on the gospel, nor on Christ, who is offered through the gospel, nor on God, who calls them through the gospel and even bestows various gifts on them, but on the people themselves who are called... "28
The important phrase in the original Latin is Christo per evangelium oblato. The word oblato is a participial form of the Latin word offero, frequently translated with its English cognate, offer. But this is not the primary meaning of the Latin verb. Rather, its most basic meanings include: to put in a person's path, to cause to be encountered; to show, reveal, exhibit; to present as something to be taken note of, to bring or force to someone's attention.29 Thus, to interpret this article as teaching that all persons who hear the gospel are confronted with Christ, or that they encounter Christ in the gospel, is at least as plausible as the assertion that such persons are offered Christ and salvation through Christ in the preaching of the gospel. Set in the context of the broader teachings of the Canons and the writings of major Reformed theologians from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the former interpretation appears to be much more plausible than the latter.
The 1924 synod, as well as Berkhof's defense of the well-meant offer, claim the support of theologians from the most flourishing period (bloeitijd) of Reformed theology. The synod cites two passages from Calvin's Institutes and one from van Mastricht. These passages pertain to the question of whether God demonstrates some kind of favor of grace to all persons in general, but they do not touch on the well-meant offer.30 Berkhof, however, cites van Mastricht, Herman Witsius, and Wilhelmus à Brakel in support of the well-meant offer.31
Van Mastricht teaches three kinds of grace: universal, common, and particular. Universal grace pertains to the natural gifts that God gives to his creatures in his providential care. There is also a common grace by which God bestows moral gifts to all persons without distinction between the elect and reprobate. Also included here, according to van Mastricht, are those gifts that are manifested in those who only appear to assent to salvation. To this category belongs the external call, as well as that form of internal call in which persons receive a temporary illumination and exhibit these gifts for a time. 32 It is not entirely clear whether the external call itself is a manifestation of common grace; he may be referring to the gifts (bona) associated with the external call.
In any case, what van Mastricht does not say is that the external call represents God's intention to save the reprobate. In fact, he writes in his chapter on calling that the universal end of external calling is to oblige all persons to come to God. The principal end is the salvation of the elect; and the accidental end, the intention with respect to the reprobate, is to silence them, to take away all their excuses, and to add more weight to their condemnation.33
Berkhof also cites Witsius' work on the covenants, where Witsius states that Christ's satisfaction and covenantal sponsorship have been "an occasion of much good even to the reprobate." It is because of Christ's death "that the gospel is preached to every creature, that gross idolatry is abolished in many parts of the world, that hellish impiety is much restrained by the discipline of the word of God, so that they obtain at times many and excellent--though not saving--gifts of the Holy Spirit, that they have escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ" (2 Peter 2:20). 34
Berkhof, however, does not proceed to cite what Witsius further says about the calling of the reprobate. God does not call them "with the purpose and design of saving them.., but for the purpose of demonstrating his patience toward the vessels of wrath."35 Reconciliation and peace with God are not offered to the reprobate, because they are "perpetual enemies to God, on whom the wrath of God abides."36 Witsius says that 2 Timothy 2:4 (God "wants all men to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth") does not mean "all and every one in particular, but the elect of whatever nation and condition."37 It does not pertain to "his will concerning every man in particular, because he will have unbelievers condemned.' It is not God's will that all should come to the knowledge of the truth because he hardens those whom he wills to harden. God cannot will the salvation of the reprobate, since "it would be unworthy of the divine majesty to imagine that there is an incomplete, unresolved, and ineffectual volition in God."38 Witsius emphatically does not teach a well-meant offer of the gospel.
There are two passages that Berkhof cites from à Brakel. In the first, à Brakel states that to common grace "belongs all the good which God bestows upon all who are called, by giving them the Word the means unto repentance and salvation .... In addition to this, God generally gives illumination, historical faith, convictions, and inner persuasion to almost become a Christian."39 In the other passage, à Brakel states that the external call comes to all who hear the gospel and not just the elect. Again, however, Berkhof fails to distinguish between call and offer. The fact that the reprobate are presented with the means of salvation and even receive certain gifts associated with the external call does not imply, for à Brakel, that God offers them salvation and intends them to receive it.
Berkhof could have cited this passage: "since many reject the gospel, it is necessarily offered (aangeboden) to them, for whatever is not offered cannot be rejected."40 Even so, this passage does not support the concept of a well-meant offer of salvation; for à Brakel has in mind a presentation of the gospel message, as evidenced by his citation of Acts 13:46: We had to speak the Word of God to you first. Since you reject it. Moreover, the next question that à Brakel poses is whether, in calling the sinner to Christ, God intends the salvation of all--a question that he answers with a definite no. "God's objective in calling the nonelect is to proclaim and acquaint people with the way of salvation, to command persons to enter this way .... It is also God's purpose to convict persons of their wickedness in his refusal to come upon such a friendly invitation." He concludes that it is "neither God's purpose and objective to give them his Holy Spirit, nor to save them." 41
À Brakel proceeds to demonstrate how God is really sincere in his calling, even though he does not intend the salvation of the reprobate. God calls all to salvation, and he intends to give salvation to all who believe. But faith and repentance are divine gifts that he only bestows to those whom he wills to save. God leaves the rest to themselves; these are unwilling, and, by their own fault, unable to fulfill the condition of faith. Because God has foreknowledge of this, and since he has decreed not to give them faith, "he therefore also cannot have their salvation in view."42 God does not act deceitfully, however, since he sincerely obligates them and sincerely reveals the conditions of salvation to them. His main end is their condemnation. Nor could à Brakel be any clearer when he says, "He did not purpose to save them."43 It should be quite clear that à Brakel does not believe that the external call of God constitutes an offer of salvation to the reprobate.
The defense of the well-meant offer of salvation was taken up in the next generation by Anthony Hoekema, professor of systematic theology at Calvin Seminary from 1958 to 1978. His study of soteriology, Saved by Grace, was published a year after his death in 1988. Hoekema's defense of the well-meant offer is largely dependant on the arguments of Berkhof and AC. De Jong. In his chapter on "The Gospel Call," Hoekema identifies three parts of the external call: (1) a presentation of the facts of the gospel and of the way of salvation; (2) an invitation to come to Christ in repentance and faith; and (3) a promise of forgiveness and salvation, conditional upon repentance and faith.44 Hoekema then defends the well-meant offer over against the position of the Protestant Reformed Churches. He declares that the Christian Reformed Church, "in contrast to Hoeksema, and in agreement with the majority of Reformed theologians, affirms that God does seriously desire the salvation of all to whom the gospel comes."45 The preaching of the gospel is "a well-meant offer of salvation, not just on the part of the preacher, but on God's part as well, to all who hear it, and... God seriously and earnestly desires the salvation of all to whom the gospel call comes."46
Hoekema begins his analysis of the issue by reminding his readers that "Hoeksema's theology is dominated by the overruling causality of the double decree of election and reprobation."47 This characterization is based on the conclusions of two critics of Hoeksema's views: AC. DeJong and, indirectly, GC. Berkouwer. 48 Having thus discredited Hoeksema's theological method from the outset, Hoekema defends the well-meant offer by citing numerous texts,49 along with excerpts from John Calvin's comments on two of these texts: Ezekiel 18:23 and 2 Peter 3:9. We will examine Calvin's interpretation of Ezekiel 18 in detail below. Calvin's comments on 2 Peter 3:9 ("not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance") explain that this passage does not refer to God's secret purpose, "according to which the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin, but only of his will as made known to us in the gospel." In the gospel, God "stretches forth his hand without a difference to all, but lays hold only of those, to lead them to himself, whom he has chosen before the foundation of the world."50 Calvin does not say that God desires the salvation of the reprobate. In fact, when he cites this passage in the Institutes, he says that when God "promises that he will give a certain few a heart of stone [ Ezek. 36:26], let him be asked whether he wants to convert all."51
Hoekema argues that the phrase "ma boulomenos tinas apolesthai" precludes the possibility of limiting this passage to the elect. But he fails to nuance the meaning of the divine will. Calvin obviously relates this passage to God's will of the precept, or revealed will, which does not relate God's will regarding the fate of specific individuals. The Leiden Synopsis makes the following distinction, which could equally be applied to this passage:
Thus they delude themselves, who extend the grace of God's calling to all, and to every individual. For they not only confuse that love of God for humanity (filanqrwpiva) bywhich he embraces all persons ascreatures, with that [love] bywhich he has decreed to receive in grace certain persons from among the common mass of sinful humanity, who were lost in their sin, and that they should follow his beloved Son Jesus Christ; they also rob God--who is bound by none--of any freedom to single out those whom he will from among the rest of his enemies, all equally unworthy of his mercy, in order that he might convey them from a state of guilt to a state of sin.52
Hoekema does recognize that the passages he cites in defense of the well-meant offer refer to God's revealed will, but he does not appear to properly discern what that revealed will entails.53 What it in fact does entail will become quite clear when we come to Turretin's discussion of the calling of the reprobate. Hoekema also repeats Berkhof's argument that the Synod of Dort agreed with the Remonstrants' contention that God offers salvation to all, but that the synod nonetheless asserted that this offer was compatible with election and limited atonement.54 Like Berkhof, he fails to make a distinction between call and offer.
The solution that Hoekema ultimately proposes is that We avoid "a rationalistic solution." He mentions the phenomenon of English hyper-Calvinism, which, "like that of Herman Hoeksema and the Protestant Reformed Churches, denied the well-meant gospel call."55 This statement is regrettable for several reasons. First, Hoeksema and the Protestant Reformed Churches do not deny the serious call of the gospel; they simply deny that this call should be characterized as an offer of salvation or represented as God's intention to impart salvation. Second, the charge of hyper-Calvinism is an unjustified and uncharitable instance of guilt by association.56 Finally, Hoekema charges that the doctrine of the well-meant offer "has tremendous significance for missions," implying, regrettably, that the denial of that doctrine entails a diminishment of missionary motivation.57
Hoekema asserts that there are two rationalistic solutions that must be avoided: the Arminian proposal of universal, sufficient grace, and the ostensibly hyper-Calvinist contention that the call does not imply God's desire to save the reprobate. We must continue to hold to both election and the well-meant offer, "even though we cannot reconcile these two teachings with our finite minds." We cannot "lock God up in the prison of human logic."58 Hoekema appeals to what he calls the "Scriptural paradox," by which he means that we must believe that apparently incompatible theological statements are in fact somehow resolved in the mind of God.59
Hoekema appeals to Calvin to justify this method--but not to Calvin himself. He cites Edward Dowey's neo-orthodox interpretation of Calvin as a dialectical theologian, a Barthian before Barth. On this basis, Hoekema contends that Calvin "was willing to combine doctrines which were clear in themselves but logically incompatible with each other, since he found them both in the Bible."60 But this interpretation of Calvin's methodology is wholly untenable; it cannot be squared with the way Calvin actually operates, particularly in his theological treatises. Calvin argues with his opponents by pointing out the logical inconsistencies in their arguments, and demonstrating both the biblical faithfulness and the logical coherence of his own.
Our theological concern, Hoekema concludes, "must not be to build a rationally coherent system, but to be faithful to all the teachings of the Bible."61 This sentiment, however, is at odds with the Reformation and pre-Reformation conviction that God's revelation is not only reasonable, but accessible to reason, and capable of a coherent systematization. The fact that not everything is revealed to us, and that our theology is limited by our human capacities, does not give us permission to advance an incoherent system of theology. We may not set faith over against logic or confession over against understanding.62
Calvin on Calling and Reprobation
Berkhof, in his defense of the three points, cites John Calvin in defense of the doctrine of the well-meant offer. He refers to Calvin's commentary on Ezekiel 18:23 and 18:32--but only cites a select portion of Calvin's comments on these texts.63 Calvin affirms that God "calls all equally to repentance, and promises himself prepared to receive them if they only seriously repent."64 Calvin even says that there is a sense in which God wills that all persons should be saved--but only on the condition that they repent. But how can this be reconciled with God's election, since God wills to give saving grace only to the elect?
Calvin answers: "God always wishes the same thing, though by different ways, and in a manner inscrutable to us. Although, therefore, God's will is simple, yet great variety is involved in it, as far as our senses are concerned."65 Here Calvin shows us his Scholastic side: He is operating with a time-honored distinction in the will of God, a distinction that for centuries had allowed exegetes to make sense of God's command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac without really intending it to occur, his command to Pharaoh to release his people while simultaneously hardening his heart so that he would not do so, and his repentance at Nineveh. This is the distinction between God's will of the precept and his will of the decree. The command to repent and the promise of salvation following upon such repentance belong to the preceptive will of God. This human duty and conditional promise is proclaimed indiscriminately to all. The condition can only be fulfilled, however, when God has decreed to give a person regenerating grace. This is what Calvin means when he says, "God puts on a twofold character."66 Ezekiel's intention in this verse is not to say anything about election and reprobation but only to show that "when we have been converted we need not doubt that God immediately meets us and shows himself gracious."67
Later, in his comments on Ezekiel 18:32, Calvin again takes up the preceptive will of God:
when God teaches what is right, he does not think of what we are able to do, but only shows us what we ought to do. When, therefore, the power of our free will is estimated by the precepts of God, we make a great mistake, because God exacts from us the strict discharge of our duty, just as if our power of obedience was not defective. We are not absolved from our obligation because we cannot pay it; for God holds us bound to himself, although we are in every way deficient.68
Thus God can demand faith and repentance from sinners, even though they have rendered themselves incapable of the required response. Berkhof cites Calvin's comments on this verse, that God "invites all to repentance and rejects no one,"69 but he does not place it in the context of God's preceptive or revealed will, which Calvin contrasts with God's will of the decree or good pleasure. Berkhof, then, presents only one side of Calvin's argument.
Calvin's treatment of Matthew 23:37 ("O Jerusalem...how often I have longed to gather your children together.., but you were not willing") employs the decretive-preceptive distinction even more explicitly. Hoekema adduces this passage as further support of the well-meant offer. On this text, however, he does not claim Calvin's support, and for good reason. Calvin warns that ''we must define the will of God now under discussion." The opponents of predestination contend that "nothing agrees less with God's nature than that he should be of a double will." But not only do they fail to see that Christ, speaking on behalf of the Godhead, condescends to the human level by employing an anthropopathic figure of speech, they also fail to recognize that, although God's will is one and simple in himself, our perception of it is manifold. Thus God "strikes dumb our senses until it is given us to recognize how wonderfully he wills what at the moment seems to be against his will."70
Calvin's lectures on Ezekiel extend only through chapter 20; but in his Institutes he does comment significantly on Ezekiel 33:11, in the context of election and reprobation. Opponents of these doctrines object that if God really takes no pleasure in the death of the wicked, then he would make it possible for all to repent. Calvin responds that "this passage is violently twisted if the will of God, mentioned by the prophet, is opposed to his eternal plan, by which he has distinguished the elect from the reprobate."71 Here again we see the contrast between the will of the precept and the will of the decree. The prophet's truemeaning, Calvin continues, "is that he would bring the hope of pardon to the penitent only. The gist of it is that God is without doubt ready to forgive, as soon as the sinner is converted. Therefore, insofar as God wills the sinner's repentance, he does not will his death."72 The proposition that God wills the salvation of all must be qualified. According to his preceptive will, God reveals what is required of persons if they are to receive forgiveness. But God in his eternal counsel wills only to bestow the grace required for repentance on the elect.
Calvin then anticipates the charge that would later be brought by the Remonstrants: If God does not really will the salvation of all, then his universal call is not sincere. Calvin admits that God wills the repentance of those whom he calls to himself "in such a way that he does not touch the hearts of all." But this does not mean that God acts deceitfully, "for even though only his outward call renders inexcusable those who hear it and do not obey, still it is truly considered evidence of God's grace by which he reconciles persons to himself."73 The universal call is a testimony of God's grace but not his common grace. It is a testimony of his saving grace that is only operative in the elect. It is not grace for the reprobate. Calvin teaches that God hates the reprobate--not as his creatures, but as those who are bereft of his Spirit and worthy of condemnation.74 The opponents of predestination claim that God extends his grace to all indiscriminately; but Calvin replies that this is only true in the sense that God extends his grace to whomever he wills in his good pleasure, without regard to any merit.75
For the reprobate, moreover, the external call is a testimony of God's judgment. "That the Lord sends his Word to many whose blindness he intends to increase cannot indeed be called into question. For what purpose does he cause so many demands to be made upon Pharaoh?"As far as the reprobate are concerned, God "directs his voice to them but in order that they may become even more deaf; he kindles a light but that they may be made even more blind; he sets forth doctrine but that they may grow even more stupid; he employs a remedy but so that they may not be healed."76 It is clear that Calvin sees the intention of the external call vis a vis the reprobate not as an offer of actual salvation but as a sign of his judgment upon human unbelief. This is even more clear from his discussion of calling: "There is an universal call, by which God, through the external preaching of the word, invites all men alike, even those for whom he designs the call to be a savor of death, and the ground of a severer condemnation."77
Surprisingly, neither the synod of 1924, nor Berkhof, nor Hoekema cite the most relevant of Calvin's works in connection with the issue of the ostensible well-meant offer: his writings on election and reprobation. In his 1552 treatise On the Eternal Predestination of God, directed against the views of Albert Pighius and Georgius Siculus, Calvin responds to Pighius' claim, based on 1 Timothy 2:4 and Ezekiel 33:11, that God desires the salvation of all persons:
Now we reply, that as the language of the prophet here is an exhortation to repentance, it is not at all marvelous in him to declare that God wills all men to be saved. For the mutual relation between these threats and promises shows that such forms of speaking are conditional. In this same manner God declared to the Ninevites, and to the kings of Gerar and Egypt, that he would do that which, in reality, he did not intend to do, for their repentance averted the punishment which he had threatened to inflict upon them ....Just so it is with respect to the conditional promises of God, which invite all men to salvation. They do not positively prove that which God has decreed in his secret counsel, but declare only what God is ready to do to all those who are brought to faith and repentance.78
If the distinction between God's preceptive and decretive will is not clear enough, Calvin adds that "as a Lawgiver, he enlightens all men with the external doctrine of conditional life. In this manner he calls, or invites, all men unto eternal life."79 This is an indiscriminate declaration of what is required for a person to receive eternal life, but it is not an offer of salvation to those whom God has decreed to leave in their sin.
Regarding the promise of the gift of conversion in Jeremiah 31:33, Calvin remarks that "a man must be utterly beside himself to assert that this promise is made to all men generally and indiscriminately."80 Actual salvation, then, is not offered to all; but the way of salvation is proclaimed to all. The proposition that God desires the salvation of every individual cannot be maintained, Calvin argues, because not even the external preaching of the word comes to everyone, let alone the illumination of the Spirit: "Now let Pighius boast, if he can, that God wills all men to be saved!"81 If God does not intend salvation for all, how can he "offer" it to all? "No one but a man deprived of his common sense and common judgment can believe that salvation was ordained by the secret counsel of God equally and indiscriminately for all men."82
Returning to Pighius' use of 1 Timothy 2:4, where Paul says that God "wants all men to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth," Calvin argues that this passage does not mean that God wants each and every individual to be saved. "Who does not see that the apostle is here speaking of orders of men rather than of individuals? Indeed, that distinction which commentators here make is not without great reason and point; that classes of individuals, not individuals of classes, are here intended by Paul."83
When Calvin turns to the arguments of the monk Georgius Siculus, he makes a comment that could be construed to support the 1924 synod's well-meant offer. His opponent claimed that God had made salvation available to all, since, as 1John 2:2declares, Christ became a propitiation for the sins of the whole world. Calvin responds that "although reconciliation is offered unto all men through him [Christ], yet, that the great benefit belongs particularly to the elect."84 But clearly Calvin does not mean that reconciliation is offered, in the modern sense of the term, to all without distinction. Given what Calvin has already said about God's not intending the salvation of all who are called, it is doubtful that he here reverses his course and affirms that God in fact offers reconciliation to the reprobate, that is, that he holds it out for them to take. Fortunately, we have Calvin's French version of this treatise, where he himself translates the phrase in question "la reconciliation faicte pare luy se presente à tous"--the reconciliation accomplished by him is presented to all. 85
The reason why Calvin does not think that God intends or offers salvation to all becomes clear, in an accidental fashion, from his commentary on that same passage. Calvin mentions the common dictum that "Christ suffered sufficiently for the whole world, but efficiently only for the elect." He admits that this is true, but he denies that this really applies to 1John 2:2, since John only has the elect in mind. Calvin adds, however, that "under the word all or whole, he does not include the reprobate, but designates those who should believe as well as those who were then scattered through various parts of the world."86
There is another passage, moreover, in which Calvin makes it quite clear that he rejects the concept of a universal atonement. Combating Tilemann Heshusius' doctrine of the physical presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper, Calvin poses the following rhetorical question: "I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them, and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?"87 We might also ask, how can redemption be offered to those for whom it was neither intended nor actually obtained? Again, how can Christ be offered to the reprobate, when in fact he has not been offered for them?
Calvin touches on this matter again in his short piece, Response to Certain Calumnies and Blasphemies, a rejection of Sebastian Castellio's objections to Calvin's doctrine of predestination. Castellio contends that God created the whole world to be saved, and that he works to draw to himself all who have gone astray. Calvin admits that this may be true in one sense, with regard to the doctrine of faith and repentance. This doctrine is published or declared (proposé) to all in general, but with a twofold purpose: to draw his elect to faith, and to render the rest inexcusable.88 God summons and exhorts all to come to him, but he does not draw all of them to himself; the promise to do so is only given to a "certain number," the elect.89
Castellio thinks that God desires the salvation of every individual because all are called. But Calvin responds that Castellio does not understand that most basic truth about God's calling (Calvin calls it the ABCs of the Christian faith): the distinction between the external and the internal call. The external call comes "from the mouths of men," while the internal call is the secret work of God. Moreover, Calvin adds, 1 Timothy 2:4 means that God desires the salvation of all who will come to a knowledge of the truth, that is, the elect.90 Castellio would do well to profit from "the little book written by our brother, Mr. Beza." This little book is Beza's Summa totius Christianismi, which includes his famous table of predestination. Far from characterizing the external call as an offer of salvation, Beza writes that God justly hates the reprobate because they are corrupt.91 As for the reprobate who hear the external call, Beza explains that
their downfall is much more severe, since he in fact grants them the external preaching, but who, despite being called, are neither willing nor even able to respond, because, they are content in their blindness, and think that they see, and because it is not given to them to embrace and believe the Spirit of truth. Consequently, although their obstinacy is necessary, it is nevertheless voluntary. This is why they refuse to come to the banquet when they are invited; for the word of life is foolishness and an offense to them, and ultimately a lethal odor that leads to death.92
Turning back to Calvin's trouncing of Castellio, he concludes his brief treatise by once more employing the distinction between God's preceptive and decretive will. It is true, he says, that God often uses a form of speech such as "Return to me, and I will come to you." But the purpose of such language is to show us what we ought to do, not what we are able to do.93
Calvin later expanded his refutation of Castellio's antipredestinarian views in a treatise on the Secret Providence of God (1558). Here again, Calvin makes it clear that the proposition in 1 Timothy 2:4, that God desires the salvation of all persons, must be qualified. "Since no one but he who is drawn by the secret influence of the Spirit can approach unto God, how is it that God does not draw all men indiscriminately to himself, if he really 'wills all men to be saved'?"94 For Calvin, this passage can mean that God wants all kinds, races, and classes of people to be saved; or it can mean that God wills that if anyone is to be saved, that person must repent and believe, and that this preceptive will of God is to be preached indiscriminately to all. But it does not mean that God earnestly desires the salvation of all who hear the preaching of the gospel.
Francis Turretin and the Calling of the Reprobate
Francis Turretin (1623-87), who held the chair of theology at the Genevan Academy from 1653 until his death, was a great synthesizer and defender of Reformed orthodoxy.95 He frequently defends and exposits the declarations of the Synod of Dort in his Institutes ofElenctic Theology His interpretation of the Canons and his exposition of the Reformed doctrine of the calling of the reprobate shed a great deal of light on this subject and demonstrate the coherence of this doctrine. At the same time, he leaves no room for the well-meant offer of salvation as it is presented by the 1924 synod and its defenders.
In his discussion of the calling of the reprobate, Turretin repudiates two assertions: First, that the reprobate are "called with the design and intention on God's part that they should become partakers of salvation;" and second, that it follows from this that "God does not deal seriously with them, but hypocritically and falsely; or that he can be accused of some injustice." Turretin states the Reformed position as follows:
we do not deny that the reprobate.., are called by God through the gospel; still we do deny that they are called with the intention that they should be made actual partakers of salvation (which God knew would never be the case because in his decree he had ordained otherwise concerning them). Nor ought we on this account to think that God can be charged with hypocrisy or dissimulation, but that he always acts most seriously and sincerely.96
God has both a common and special end in his call. The common end, that is common to all who receive it, is "the demonstration of the mode and way of salvation and the promise of salvation to those who profess the prescribed condition.."97 The special end for the elect is "the actual bestowal of salvation upon those whom on that account he calls not only imperatively but also operatively; not only by prescribing duty, but by performing that very duty, working within us by his Spirit what he externally commands by his Word."98 For the reprobate, God's end "is their conviction and inexcusability."99
The question, according to Turretin, is not whether "God wills to bestow any grace upon reprobates over and above those who are destitute of this blessing (such as the heathen and other infidels) but whether he intends to give saving grace or salvation to them and calls them with this purpose, that they may really become partakers of it .... "which Turretin denies. Here Turretin may acknowledge the possibility of some other kind of grace besides saving grace; the call itself may even be a (temporary) blessing.100
Turretin proceeds to demonstrate, in six arguments, how God can deal seriously with the reprobate, even when he does not intend their salvation.
1. "God cannot in calling intend the salvation of those whom he reprobated from eternity and from whom he decreed to withhold faith and other means leading to salvation. Otherwise he would intend what is contrary to his own will and what he knew in eternity would never take place, and that it would not take place because he, who alone can, does not wish to do it. This everyone sees to be repugnant to the wisdom, goodness, and power of God."101
2. "God does not intend faith in the reprobate; therefore neither does he intend salvation, which cannot be attained without faith."102
3. "Christ, in calling the reprobate Jews, testifies that his proposed end was their inexcusability" (ajnapologiva; cf. John 9:39, 15:22).103
4. "Those who are called with the intention of salvation are 'called according to purpose' (kata prothesin, Rom. 8:28), the purpose of which is that they love God, be justified, etc.104
5. "Salvation according to the intention of God is promised to none other than those having the prescribed condition .... Since this cannot be said of the reprobate, it equally cannot be said that they are called by God with the intention that they should be saved."105
6. "It can no more be said that God calls each and every individual with the intention that they should be saved, than that they should be damned. For a conditioned promise includes the opposite threatening, so that every unbeliever will be condemned as every believer is to be saved .... It can no more be concluded that God wills all to be saved for the reason that he promises pardon of sin and salvation to all promiscuously (if they repent), than that he does not will the salvation of all for the reason that he denounces a curse and death upon all (unless they repent and believe)."106
Turretin can use the term offer (oblatio, the nominal form of offero, which can also mean "presentation"107) in explaining how the reprobate are called seriously yet without the intention of salvation; but he does so in a way that is quite incompatible with the claims of the welgemeende aanbod des heils:
Although God does not intend the salvation of reprobate by calling them, still he acts most seriously and sincerely; nor can any hypocrisy or deception be charged against him--neither with respect to God himself, because he seriously and most truly shows them the only and most certain way of salvation, seriously exhorts them to follow it and most sincerely promises salvation to all those who do follow it, namely, to those who believe and repent; nor does he only promise, but actually bestows it according to his promise; nor in regard to men, because the offer [or presentation, oblatio] of salvation is not made to them absolutely, but under a condition, and thus it posits nothing unless the condition is fulfilled, which is wanting on the part of man.108
The key to understanding how God can seriously call the reprobate without intending their salvation is the distinction between the will of the decree and that of the precept:
if he shows that he wills a thing by the will of precept and yet does not will it by the will of decree, there is no simulation or hypocrisy here, as in prescribing the law to men, he shows that he wills that they should fulfill it by approbation and command, but not immediately as to decree. Now in calling God indeed shows that he wills the salvation of the called by the will of precept and good pleasure (envarestiva), but not by the will of decree. For calling shows what God wills man should do, but not what he himself haddecreed to do. It teaches what is pleasing and acceptable to God and in accordance with his own nature, namely, that one should come to him; but not what he himself has determined to do concerning man. It signifies what God is prepared to give believers and penitents, but not what he has actually decreed to give to this or that person.109
It is one thing to will reprobates to come, i.e. to command them to come...another to will that they should not come, i.e. not to will to give them the power to come. God can in calling them will the former and yet not the latter without any contrariety because the former has to do only with the will of precept, while the latter has to do with the will of the decree For a serious call does not require that there should be an intention and purpose of drawing him, but only that there should be a constant will of commanding duty and bestowing the blessing upon him who performs it, which God most seriously wills.110
Turretin also clarifies the relationship between the will of God in calling and the role of the preacher in proclaiming the gospel. The preacher can proclaim that Christ is the Savior of all who will come to him in faith -- a truth that even the reprobate can believe.111 Pastors are to "invite all their hearers promiscuously to repentance and faith as the only way of salvation, and, supposing these, to salvation; and they ought to intend nothing else than the gathering of the church or the salvation of the elect."112 Pastors do not know who will benefit from their preaching. They certainly cannot distinguish between the elect and the reprobate. In charity they may wish the best for all; and they dare not judge any person to be reprobate. At the same time, however, their intention is none other than that of the Lord: they intend only the salvation of the elect, whoever they may be.113
In his discussion of the various distinctions in the will of God, Turretin makes it clear that it is the will of the decree (or good pleasure) that is more properly referred to as the will of God; this is usually what is meant by "the will of God." The decree of the precept (or complacency) "does not properly include any decree or volition in God, but implies only the agreement of the thing [commanded or prescribed] with the nature of God." Thus it is "less properly called the will of God."114 Thus, when we ask whether God wills all to be saved, the answer is, properly speaking, no.
Conclusion
The substantial error committed by the 1924 synod was its acceptance of the Arminian definition of the sincere call--a definition that is clearly rejected by Canons III/IV.8. The acceptance of the doctrine of common grace, however, by no means entails acceptance of the well-meant offer, contrary to the contention of Hoeksema, Danhof, and the Protestant Reformed Churches. There was, however, an overemphasis on the doctrine of common grace in the 1920s that was just as extremist as the denial of that doctrine. Given the fact that the concept of common grace is only marginal and implicit among Reformed theologians of the sixteenth century, and only becomes an explicit doctrine later in the seventeenth century, it is utterly untenable to claim that common grace is "the fountain head of Reformed thought."115 Extremism on both sides exacerbated the situation unnecessarily, as did the failure of both sides to carefully consider their opponents' arguments and to give the issue the proper historical and theological study that it required.
The concept of a well-meant offer of salvation may have its origin in the teachings of William Heyns and Jan Karel van Baalen--an issue that deserves further study.116 Heyns, who taught Practical Theology at Calvin Theological Seminary, proposed a view of the covenant and of divine grace that was clearly out of step with the Reformed confessions. Heyns spoke of a subjective covenant grace that, because it also imparted an intrinsic capacity (innerlijke vatbaarheid), was sufficient to bring covenant children to salvation if they made good use of the means of grace.117 Even A. C. DeJong, who defends the well-meant offer, recognizes that "Heyn's view of an innerlijke vatbaarheid can scarcely be distinguished from the Remonstrant Limborch's concept of some sinners as being very receptive to the working of saving grace."118 This fact, combined with the acceptance of the Remonstrant definition of the serious call, adds weight to the charge that the 1924 synod added Arminian elements to Reformed soteriology. At the very least, this charge cannot be dismissed out of hand, even if the charge is frequently made in the most extreme terms and with a minimum of charity.
The 1920s are not the most illustrious period in the history of the Christian Reformed Church. This was also the era of the Janssen case, in which Professor Ralph Janssen was removed from the Seminary faculty on the basis of student notes. In the 1924 synodical proceedings on common grace, the voices of charity, reason, and restraint went unheeded. We can only wish that the substitute motions, which urged further study of the issue rather than a precipitous judgment of both the issues and persons involved, had been accepted at the synod of 1924.119 Numerous delegates to the 1924 synod, including those who agreed with the doctrine of common grace, registered their protests against the declaration of the synod. Several of these protests argued that the issue had not received adequate study, and that it was not in the best interest of the churches to make such a definitive statement and to condemn the teachings of Revs. Hoeksema and Danhof at that time.120
There was a rush to judgment in the case of Hoeksema and Danhof that contributed to a serious ecclesiastical schism as well as the introduction of the rather dubious doctrine of the well-meant offer of salvation. Berkhof, and later Hoekema, seem to realize that it is not logically compatible with the doctrines of limited atonement and divine election and reprobation, but they feel compelled to affirm it nonetheless. In so doing, however, they are saying something quite different from what our confessional standards affirm. In the future, the Christian Reformed Church and the Protestant Reformed Churches should strive to amend the errors of the past, and perhaps even obtain a greater degree of charitable respect for their brothers and sisters in Christ.
End-Notes:
4 AS 1924, art. 132, pp. 145-46.
7 "dat God met een welgemeend aanbod des heils tot allen komt," AS 1924, art. 100, p.126.
8 "de algemeene aanbieding des Evangelies," AS 1924, art. 100, p.127.
10 See, for example, Canons III/IV, Rejection of Errors V.
13 See DP, 15-16.
14 Ibid
15 "Deze roeping des Evangelies, of dit aanbod des heils is, volgens de Synode, algemeen," DP, 13.
16 Berkhof insists that it is the minister's divine duty to "offer the promise of the gospel. And it is precisely here that we hit upon the general offer of salvation," DP, 15. But later he says that this doctrine refers to God's sincere offer, DP, 17-18.
18 Canons of Dort, 1.15.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 See below, note 86.
30 AS 1924, 128-29.
31 DP, 28-29.
34 Occasione sponsionis et satisfactionis Christi multo bona reprobis quoque obtingere. Hoc enim morti Christi debent quod Evangelium praedicetur omni creaturae, quod crassa illa idolatria ex multis mundi partibus abolita sit, quod profana impietas verbi Divini paedagogia plurimum coerceatur, quod multa et excellentia quandoque, licet non salutaria, Spiritus Sancti dona obtineant, quod per agnitionem Domini et servatoris Jesu Christi pollutiones mundi effugerint 2 Pet. 2:20," Herman Witsius,De Oeconomia Foederum Dei cum hominibus, libri quatuor (Leeuwarden: Jacob Hagenaar, 1677), 2.9.4. English translation adapted from The Oeconomy of the Covenants (New York: George Forman for Lee & Stokes, 1798).
36 Contra reprobi sunt hostes Dei perpetui, super quos ira Dei manet," Witsius, Oec. Foed., 2.9.7.
38 Non autem vult hoc de singulis hominibus: quia vult non credentes damnari, Joh. 3.36. Et agnitio veritatis, sive fides, non est omnium, 2 Thes. 3.2, sed electorum, Tit. 1.1. Neque vult Deus eam esse omnium. Indurat quem vult, Rom. 9.18. Porrovo1itionem aliquem incompletam, suspensam, et quae effectum non sortiatur Deo affingere, Numinis Majestate indignum est. Ps. 115.3," Witsius, Oec. Foed. 2.9.8.
42 "zoo kan Hij hunne zaligheid beoogen," À Brakel, Redelijke Godsdienst, 2:722-23; Eng. trans. 207.
43 "Hij beoogde niet hen zalig te maken," À. Brakel, Reddijke Godsdienst, 2:723; Eng. trans. 207.
45 Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 72.
46 Ibid., 73.
49 "These texts are Ezekiel 18:23, 33:11; Matthew 23:37; 2 Peter 3:9, and 2 Corinthians 5:20, Saved by Grace, 73-77.
51 Calvin, Institutes, 3.24.16: "Sane conversio in Dei manu est; an velit omnes convertere, inter-rogetur ipse: dum paucis quibusdam se daturum promittit cor carneum, aliis cor lapideum relinquendo." Latin citations of the Institutes are from Ioannis Calvini Opera Selecta, 5 vols., ed. Peter Barth and Wilhelm Niesel (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1926-52), 4:429, hereafter cited as OS.
53 Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 76.
54 Ibid., 77-78.
55 Ibid., 78.
56 David J. Engelsma persuasively puts this charge to rest in his Hyper-Calvinism.
57 Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 79.
58 Ibid., 79.
59 Ibid., 6. Hoekema discusses "the concept of paradox" on pp. 5-7.
61 Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 79.
64 Calvin, Comm. Ezek. 18:23: "Tenemus itaque nunc Deum nolle mortem peccatoris, quia omnes indifferenter ad poenitentiam vocat, et promittit se paratum fore ad eos recipiendos, modo serio resipiscant," CO, 40:445; CTS Ezekiel, 2:247.
65 "Si quis iterum excipiat, Deum hoc modo fieri duplicem, responsio in promptu est, Deum semper idem velle, sed diversis modis, et quidem nobis incognitis. Quanquam itaque simplex est Dei voluntas, varietas quidem est illic implicita, quantum attinet ad sensum nostrum," CO, 40:445-46; CTS Ezekiel, 2:247.
66 Sed notandum est, Deum duplicem personam induere," CO, 40:446; CTS Ezekiel 2:248.
67 "Ubi conversi fuerint homines, minime dubitandum esse, quin Deus statim illis occurrat et ostendat se illis propitium," CO, 40:446; CTS Ezekiel 2:24849, alt.
69 Calvin, Comm. Ezek. 18:32, CTS Ezekiel 2:266; Berkhof, DP, 22.
70 Calvin, Institutes, 3.24.17, OS, 4:430-31. Calvin's commentary on Matt. 23:37 employs the same arguments; see CTS Harmony of the Gospels, 3:108-9.
72 "Nunc si quaeritur genuinus Prophetae sensus, tantum spem veniae resipiscentibus facere vult. Atque haec summa est, non esse dubitandum quin Deus paratus sit ignoscere, simulac conversus fuerit peccator. Ergo eius mortem non vult, quatenus vult poenitentiam," Calvin, Institutes, 3.24.15; OS, 4:427.
74 Calvin, Institutes, 3.24.17: "doceo, reprobos Deo exosos esse," OS, 4:431.
75 Calvin, Institutes, 3.24.17; OS, 4:431.
77 Calvin, Institutes, 3.24.8: "Estenim universalis vocatio, qua per externam verbi praedicationem omnes pariter ad se invitat Deus: etiam quibus eam in morris odorem, et gravioris condemnationis materiam proponit," OS, 4:419.
78 Calvin, De aeterna Dei praedestinatione, OO, SE, 112-13; Calvin's Calvinism, 1:99, alt.
80 "Desipiet enim, si quis dicat generaliter hoc omnibus promitti," OO, SE, 1:114; Calvin's Calvinism, 1:100.
82 "Ne quis nisi sensu et iudicio privatus credat arcano Dei consilio statutam aequaliter omnibus salutem esse," OO, SE, 1:118; Calvin's Calvinism, 1:104.
85 OO, SE, 1:197; cf. the introduction to this volume, 24, where O. Fatio argues that the French translation of the treatise is from Calvin's hand.
86 Calvin, Comm. I John 2:2: "Ergo sub omnibus, reprobos non comprehendit: sed eos designat qui simul credituri erant, et qui per varias mundi plagas dispersi erant," CO, 55:310; CTS Catholic Epistles, 173.
87 "Et qnando tam mordicus verbis adhaeret, scire velim quomodo Christi carnem edant impii, pro quibus non est crucifixa, et quomodo sanguinem bibant, qui expiandis eorum peccatis non est effusns," Clear Explanation of Sound Doctrine concerning the True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood of Christ in the Holy Supper (1561), CO, 9:484; English translation in Calvin: Theological Treatises, ed. J.K.S. Reid (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), 285.
91 The phrase is "Dominus qui reprobos merito, quatenus corrupti sunt, execratur," in Beza's Summa totius Christianismi...in Tractationum Theologicarum (Geneva: Eusthathius Vignon, 1582), 190.
93 "Vray est que Dieu use souvent de ce propos, Retournez à moy, et ie viendray à vous: reals c'est pour monstrer quel est nostre devoir, non pas quelle est nostre faculte," CO, 58:206.
97 "modi ac viae salutis demonstratio, et promissio salutis iis qui conditionem praescriptam habuerint," Inst. Elenct., 15.2.5; Opera, 2:444.
99 "convictio eorum et inexcusabilitas," Inst. Elenct., 15.2.5; Opera, 2:444.
103 "Quia Christus in Vocatione Judaeorum reproborum testatur se finem propositum habere eorum ajapalogivan John 9:39; 15:22," Inst. Elenct., 15.2.10; Opera, 2:445.
l07 See the Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. "oblatio": "the offering of something, tender, presentation."
111 lnst. Elenct., 15.2.19; Opera, 2:447.
l18 AC. DeJong, Well-Meant Offer, 76.
119 One substitute motion reads:
That synod, having considered the advice of the pre-advisory committee with regard to the protests against the conception of the Brothers Danhof and Hoeksema, which have been submitted to synod, it now be decided to "step down" from the matter of common grace, with the earnest admonition that a thorough study be made of this matter, and that this be done in the spirit of brotherly love and mutual appreciation of contrary views.
In order that this thorough study be carried out, it be decided by synod to appoint a committee representing all sides, in which Revs. Danhof and Hoeksema will have a voice and that this committee will serve the next synod with clarification and enlightenment concerning this very important question.
In conclusion, that synod declare that the protesters (whose good intentions in submitting their protests are appreciated) be satisfied with this decision and should rest in this decision, in light of the fact that it is the judgment of synod that the time is not yet ripe to make a precise declaration concerning this question which has been placed before synod by the protesters. (AS 1924, art 124, pp. 143-44, rejected in art. 129, p. 145.)
120 See AS 1924, art. 149, pp. 192-99.
